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Global Social Security: 
How the Rules are Changing in Certain Countries 
Robert J. Myers* 
Abstract 
Social security programs (i.e., national pension systems) differ widely between 
countries. This is only natural, and desirable, because of varying social and economic 
conditions and philosophies. 
This paper discusses some of the general worldwide trends, such as the equal 
treatment of men and women, increases in the normal retirement age, projection of 
future costs, and the different philosophies of social security. Some of the interesting 
and unique changes recently made in selected countries-Canada, Chile, Eastern 
European countries, Germany, Japan, People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, and United States-are described. 
Key words and phrases: global social security, social security, national pension systems, 
phzlosophies of SOCIal security 
1 Introduction 
There have been several interesting and significant developments 
that recently have occurred in social security around the world. Some 
of these suggest worldwide trends, whereas others are unique to par-
ticular nations. This paper describes such developments in several 
selected countries. 
The term social security as used here means only the limited con-
cept of a national pension system. It does not include programs such as 
unemployment insurance, family allowances, workers' compensation, 
and health care that some persons consider to be branches of social 
security. 
2 Worldwide Major Developments 
In recent years two major developments in social security have 
occurred in most countries. The first one is equal treatment for men 
* Robert J. Myers, F.5.A., M.A.A.A., F.C.A., held various actuarial positions with the 
Social Security Administration beginning in 1934 and was Chief Actuary from 1947-
1970. In 1981, he was named Deputy Commissioner of Social Security and became 
Executive Director of the 1982-1983 National Commission on Social Security Reform. 
He is Professor of Actuarial Science Emeritus at Temple University. 
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and women. This is an easy concept to understand. If a higher retire-
ment age applies for men than for women (often a difference of five 
years), for example, this is not equal treatment. Also, many differ-
ences occur where women have been treated less favorably than men: 
survivor benefits, for example, have been available in some countries 
for male workers, but not for female workers. Many technical diffi-
culties arise, however, in implementing equal treatment. 
The second major development in many countries is the likely 
future financing problem as the population ages; in other words, as 
there are relatively more persons at retirement age compared to per-
sons of working age. This growing proportion of older persons creates 
(or can create) financial problems, especially if a country does not 
recognize that financing problems are likely to occur in the future. 
Some years ago, few countries did any serious forecasting of what 
their social security programs would cost 20, 30, or even 75 years 
hence. Many countries merely looked ahead a year or two. This 
worked well for some years, but as the aging of the population has 
continued, the financial burden has become heavier. In contrast, some 
countries (such as the United States) have made long-range projec-
tions for many years. 
Projecting 50 to 75 years into the future cannot be done with great 
precision, any more than one can predict with precision what the 
weather will be in several weeks. But just as with the weather, one 
does know that, if it is summer and winter is coming in about six 
months, it will be colder then. One may not know exactly how much 
colder, though. Long-range projections have given many countries some 
indication of the problems that will be coming. In recent years more 
countries have become concerned about the long-range future costs of 
their social security programs. 
3 Role of Visiting Experts 
Next I will discuss some of the most interesting specific develop-
ments in several countries with which I am familiar. Obviously, one 
article cannot describe what is happening in all countries! 
When a person travels to another country as a consultant in the 
field of social security (or, for that matter, any other field), he or 
she should not use what is done in his or her own country as an abso-
lute guide for what other countries ought to do. Instead, technical 
experts should consider what the particular situation is in a country 
as compared not only with their native land, but also with countries 
throughout the world. What operates well and is desirable in one 
country frequently may have just the opposite outcome in another 
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country. There is no one perfect way of doing things; there are many 
different alternatives. The choice of which alternative to take is 
often not merely financial, actuarial, or economic, but is also depen-
dent upon the political or psychological characteristics of the coun-
try. 
4 United Kingdom 
Now let us take a tour around the world, going eastward from the 
Americas. The first country I will discuss is the United Kingdom, 
which faces a serious problem concerning equal treatment by sex. This 
problem has been especially acute since the United Kingdom joined 
the European Economic Community (E.E.C.). The U.K. has had a five 
year differential in the minimum retirement ages for men and women 
in its social security program (60 for women and 65 for men). The ben-
efits for women with similar earnings records often are higher in 
order to make up for the fact that their contribution period or service 
period is shorter. The E.E.c., however, believes that there should be 
equal treatment of men and women in all respects-social security, 
pensions, and so forth. 
The U.K. has a dilemma because private pension plans must 
have equal treatment; if they do not, legal suits can be brought in 
E.E.c. courts. On the other hand, the E.E.C. doctrine on equal treat-
ment does not control social security systems completely. At this time 
an employer in the U.K. with a private pension plan must provide 
equal treatment; if women can retire at age 60 with a certain amount 
of pension, men must have the same amount at that age. At the same 
time, however, the social security system does not pay the same ben-
efit to men as to women, especially at ages 60 to 64. The employer 
cannot bridge the gap by providing a temporary benefit to men to 
equalize treatment in the aggregate between men and women because 
it would be unfair discrimination against women; men would have 
larger benefits from the private pension plan! 
The real solution to this problem is to have the social security 
system also provide equal treatment. The U.K. government is strug-
gling with this matter. One difficulty with equalizing retirement 
ages between men and women by lowering the age for men is the 
greatly increased cost of the program. But if the age for women is 
raised, many female workers will be extremely dissatisfied, espe-
cially those now near the current retirement age. In the end, how-
ever, this equalization must be done. Probably the best way to 
equalize treatment of men and women is not suddenly, but with a 
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gradual transition. In any event, the U.K. has a difficult problem in 
this area. 
Another interesting development in the u.K. is connected to indi-
viduals opting out of the social security system. The U.K. system is 
composed of two parts: a flat benefit and an earnings-related benefit. 
For many years, employers have been able to opt out of the earnings-
related benefit portion if they provide at least equivalent benefits. 
Although this makes the system complicated, it has been working 
reasonably well. Over the past two or three years, however, changes 
in the system have allowed persons in a plan that had opted out of 
the earnings-related benefit portion to opt out of the plan individu-
ally if they provide their own retirement protection. Also, persons 
whose employers do not opt out can opt out individually. Individual 
opting-out is undesirable, because it will be difficult to prevent 
adverse selection and the resulting increased costs. At the same time, 
the principle of social solidarity is violated. 
5 Former Soviet Union 
The next country is the former Soviet Union, which has the same 
problem as the United Kingdom: unequal retirement ages for men and 
women (namely, 55 for women and 60 for men). A Russian colleague of 
mine informed me that this is a great concern. Their experts know 
that they should have equal ages by sex, but this is difficult to 
achieve from a political standpoint. With all of the other problems 
facing the former Soviet Union, however, this one is undoubtedly not 
high on the list of priorities. 
Another problem in the former Soviet Union is that pensions are 
low. For many years I attended international conferences on social 
security where Soviet delegates would proclaim that they had the 
most wonderful social security system. They asserted that it took care 
of all the needs of all their people and that it was paid for entirely 
by employing entities and by government and not at all by workers. 
The level of benefits of the social security program relative to 
earnings in the Soviet Union a few years ago was close to that in the 
United States. As in the United States, the benefits are graded, i.e., 
relatively higher for low income persons and relatively lower for 
high income persons. For example, for a worker in the United States 
with average earnings over the working lifetime, the benefit is about 
42 percent of final wages. For the low paid worker, the benefit is 55 
percent to 60 percent of final wages. For the highest paid worker (up 
to the maximum earnings considered for benefit purposes), the benefit 
is 25 percent to 27 percent of final wages. 
8 
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In the former Soviet Union, the mInImUm retirement ages are 
lower than in the U.S. Their level of total retirement income is rela-
tively low, however, because the social security benefits are the only 
source of retirement income in most cases. In contrast, many persons in 
the U.S. have private pensions in addition to Social Security bene-
fits, as well as more private savings, home ownership, and so forth. 
The total retirement-benefit level in the former Soviet Union is low, 
and its policy makers are concerned about the situation. With the 
recent horrendous inflation, the purchasing value of benefits has 
dropped sharply despite month by month ad hoc adjustments (which 
essentially merely raise the minimum pension so that virtually all 
beneficiaries receive the same amount). 
A surprising development occurred in the social security field in 
the Soviet Union in 1988. The former Soviet Union then had only one 
insurance company, Gosstrakh, which was owned by the government 
(although some individually owned companies now are being estab-
lished). Gosstrakh sells insurance policies of the standard forms that 
life insurance companies in any country sell, although it tends to spe-
cialize in short-term endowment policies of five to ten years. These 
policies are sold by agents, as in other countries. The premium rates 
are determined actuarially, so that all policyholders are paid an 
equitable amount, and the system costs the government nothing. The 
government probably even makes a profit on it. 
In 1988, Gosstrakh began writing individual deferred-annuity 
policies, under which individuals could buy a certain unit of monthly 
pension (such as ten rubles), beginning at age 60 for men and age 55 for 
women. Although these policies were sold by agents, the premiums 
were collected through payroll deduction. This was unlike their life 
insurance policies, under which agents usually came to the home to 
collect premiums. 
The basic reason for this new plan, as stated in the decree that 
established it, was that social security benefits were too low, partic-
ularly for workers at average and higher earnings levels. In this 
way, those in this economic category could provide more adequate 
retirement incomes for themselves on a voluntary basis. 
The premium rates, unlike those for the life insurance policies, 
were not established on an actuarial basis. Rather, the premium 
rates reflected a considerable government subsidy. Thus, this plan 
involved a government policy to increase individual retirement 
income, but to have individuals partially pay for it directly. 
To an actuary, it seems strange that the same premium rate was 
charged for men and women for a given amount of pension that was 
deferred for a prescribed number of years in spite of the fact that 
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women live longer. Further, the premium rate for a woman age x who 
received the benefit 30 years later (at age x + 30) was the same as 
the premium rate for a man age x + 5 who did not receive the benefit 
until age x + 35. A double action was present, which resulted in bar-
gain rates to women because of their favorable mortality and because 
of the earlier age at which they received the pension. 
The rates were graded actuarially by age at issue, however. If 
one bought a benefit of ten rubles a month at retirement age, the pre-
mium was much higher if the policy were bought a short time before 
retirement age was reached than if a longer period of deferment was 
involved. 
Considerable interest in the new voluntary-annuity program was 
expressed when it began operating in 1988. A reported 400,000 poli-
cies were sold in the first year. By 1989, when extensive liberaliza-
tions in the social security benefits were proposed by the government, 
however, interest in the voluntary annuities plummeted. Thus, most 
of the policies were allowed to lapse, and few new policies were 
written. An interesting (and amazing) development apparently came 
to an end and is unlikely to be resurrected, considering the political 
and economic upheaval in the Soviet Union in 1990 to 1991. (This 
upheaval also made existing policies virtually worthless as a result 
of inflation.) 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union into separate independent 
nations has created many problems in the social security field. 
Whether each of the nations will establish new systems, how such 
systems will be funded, how the new nations will divide the old sys-
tem and its assets, and how they will deal with persons who worked 
in different former republics are unresolved questions facing the new 
countries of the former Soviet Union. 
6 Germany 
Germany is experiencing just the opposite situation. But the reuni-
fication of Germany, essentially a merger of East Germany into West 
Germany, presents many of the same problems in the social security 
area. West Germany essentially has absorbed the East Germans into 
their social security system and will pay the extra costs involved. 
The system for the reunified Germany will be much like (if not 
entirely the same as) the previous system for West Germany. 
Nonetheless, some transitional problems will be present, particularly 
in areas where the East German program provisions were more lib-
eral. 
10 
Journal of Actuarial Practice Vol. 1, No.1, 1993 
7 Eastern European Countries 
The Eastern European countries have problems with their social 
security programs that are similar, in some ways, to those in the 
former Soviet Union, as well as some uniquely different problems. 
Their retirement ages vary by sex and are also very low, which 
results in high contribution rates. Unlike the former Soviet Union, 
their benefit levels are high, further resulting in high contribution 
rates. Their disability experience is high, in part due to loose admin-
istration. Coverage compliance has deteriorated as the societies in 
Eastern European countries have become freer. 
Some economic planners within the Eastern European countries-
as well as visiting experts from other nations-seek to privatize, in 
whole or in part, their social security programs along the Chilean 
line (as discussed later). At the same time, they would like to turn 
over to the new system some of the assets of former nationalized 
industries and companies. From another point of view, however, 
experienced administrators of the social security programs seem to 
believe that solutions to their problems can be found within the tra-
ditional framework of social insurance. 
In any event, it seems likely that the level of benefits under some 
of the Eastern European systems will be lowered somewhat. At the 
same time, private pension plans (along traditional lines, including 
private sector investments) are expected to develop. 
8 Saudi Arabia 
Let us next go south and east to Saudi Arabia. This country has a 
traditional social insurance system, with contribution rates of 8 per-
cent from the employer and 5 percent from the employee. The pension 
is related to the individual's most recent salary. Initially there was 
a very liberal vesting provision, so that persons who worked just a 
few years and then left the country were eligible for a partial pen-
sion payable when retirement age was reached. 
Many foreign workers come to Saudi Arabia for short periods. 
These workers are not only from the United States and Europe, but 
from many other countries throughout the world, such as Korea and 
the Philippines. In many ways, this liberal treatment for foreign 
workers said, in essence, "You'll get a partial retirement pension 
when you reach retirement age, which will be sent to you in your 
home country, even though you have been out of Saudi Arabia for 
some years." 
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Several years ago, the law was changed. Persons who are not liv-
ing in Saudi Arabia at the time when they reach retirement age no 
longer can obtain these vested pensions. Instead, they receive only a 
refund of employee contributions without interest. This has helped 
the financing of the Saudi system greatly, because all employer con-
tributions and investment earnings on employee contributions remain 
within the system. One difficulty in the Saudi system is tracking the 
location of foreign workers over time. As with many social security 
systems, when individuals seek benefits, they must go to the system 
and ask for them. There are many persons who have worked in Saudi 
Arabia over the last 20 or 30 years who may forget that they have 
vested pensions coming from the Saudi system when they reach 
retirement age. It is unlikely that they have heard that the only 
thing that they can receive is the refund of their contributions. 
9 People's Republic of China 
Our next stop is China. For the 90 percent of its huge population 
in rural areas, no national pension system or social security program 
exists. For workers in industry, commerce, and government, however, 
legislation has required each establishment to set up a pension plan 
of a more or less standard type for some years. For example, a steel 
mill must have a pension plan for its employees. These pension plans 
usually have a retirement age of 60 for men and 55 for women-again, 
the problem of unequal treatment by sex-and they pay benefits of 
about 70 percent of final wages for a lifetime of employment. The 
plans are financed entirely by the employing establishment, com-
pletely on a pay-as-you-go (or current-cost) basis. In other words, 
there has been no funding (or even establishment of reserves) for per-
sons who currently are retired. Another problem is that individuals 
are required to be in service when they reach retirement age. Thus, if 
they move from job to job, almost all pension rights are lost. 
In the past five years, the Chinese government has been more con-
cerned about matters relating to economic development. The govern-
ment has decided that the previous employment system (under which 
once a person was hired for a job, it was a lifetime one) is not desir-
able. It now believes that there could be more productivity if there 
were freedom of movement from one type of employment to another. 
But the difficulty with this change is that pensions often would not 
be available because of the lack of vesting. 
Another economic development problem is that companies or 
establishments that have been operating for many years have a rela-
tively high pension cost because current pensions are paid with cur-
12 
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rent income. A similar establishment that has just begun operations 
has no current pension costs and, therefore, can produce at a much 
lower cost. Thus, the older establishments are at an economic disad-
vantage. 
The Chinese government is concerned about how pay-as-you-go 
financing of private pension plans affects their economic develop-
ment. As a result, government officials have been thinking about 
having a national system to equalize the cost between new and old 
establishments. Naturally, the new establishments (and the 
provinces where the establishments are mostly new ones) prefer the 
status quo because it results in lower costs for them. They do not want 
to share the higher pension costs of Shanghai or Beijing. This is cur-
rently a difficult political, as well as technical, problem in China. 
10 Japan 
Next let us turn to Japan, which currently has the lowest mortal-
ity in the world (in other words, the greatest longevity). This, in 
turn, means high social security and penSion costs. The Japanese gov-
ernment has recognized for some years this coming trend and gradu-
ally has increased the minimum retirement ages. 
Japan has two national pension systems. One provides flat bene-
fits for the entire general population: not only employees, but also 
self-employed persons (farmers, operators of small businesses, and so 
forth). The other is an earnings-related program that applies in 
manufacturing and commercial industries. In the flat-benefit plan, the 
minimum retirement age has been increased to 65 for the normal pen-
sion for both men and women, but individuals may retire as early as 
age 60 and receive a reduced pension. On the other hand, persons can 
retire later, up to age 70, and receive an increased pension. 
In the earnings-related plan, the retirement ages at one time were 
60 for men and 55 for women, but they are being increased by five 
years for women on a gradual transitional basis (reaching age 60 for 
those born after April 1, 1941), which eventually will solve the 
problem of unequal treatment by sex. The Japanese are concerned 
about the relatively low retirement ages; some persons in the gov-
ernment want to increase the age for both men and women to 65 in 
order to solve the problem of high cost that will occur as the popula-
tion ages. Although the government wants to make this change, the 
situation is difficult politically. When this change is made, it will 
be phased in gradually; at the moment, however, it has been put 
aside until some more propitious time when the government hopes 
13 
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there will be fewer complaints from both men and women about rais-
ing the retirement age. 
Another interesting feature in the Japanese system-one that is 
surprising and one that the authorities now have become aware of-
is the factors that are used to adjust benefit amounts for early and 
late retirement in the flat-benefit plan. Decreases are made because 
of early retirement and increases because of late retirement. 
Despite the technical and actuarial expertise available in Japan, 
somebody erred when the adjustment factors were established. For a 
person retiring at age 60, the reduction for not waiting until age 65 to 
receive benefits should be generally about 30 percent. In the Japanese 
plan, however, the reduction is 42 percent, a very bad deal from an 
actuarial standpoint. Thus, if persons can avoid filing for benefits at 
age 60 and wait until age 65, they are in a much better financial 
position. Also, rather surprisingly, there is no graduation in the pro-
vision. The factor depends on integral years of age; in other words, 
there is only one reduction factor applicable if retirement occurs 
between ages 60 and 61, but another smaller factor-35 percent-
applies for retirement at age 61. It would seem more reasonable if the 
reduction factors moved smoothly from age 60 to age 65, with 
monthly changes. 
The beneficiaries involved are aware of this situation; almost 
everybody takes the benefit at an exact age. The surprising thing is 
that so many persons take benefits at age 60. Some undoubtedly have 
to because they do not have other resources, but there are many oth-
ers who would not have to take benefits. Many persons are disadvan-
taged by not realizing that a bad deal exists! 
At the other end of the retirement band, if instead of taking the 
benefit at age 65, persons wait until age 70, the actuarial increase 
should be 40 percent to 50 percent. In this system, however, this dif-
ferential is 80 percent. Anybody in good health who had the advice 
of an actuary would not take the pension until age 70! In actual expe-
rience, very few persons do. 
11 Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
Next let us go to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, other-
wise known as Micronesia which has a population of about 200,000. 
This is a group of islands in the Central Pacific that the United 
States received as a trust from the United Nations after World War 
II. In 1986, the Trust Territory was divided into four parts, three of 
which are now independent nations-the Republic of Palau, the 
Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall 
14 
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Islands. The fourth part, the Northern Mariana Islands, voted to 
become part of the United States (just as is Guam, which in essence is 
the Southern Mariana Islands). 
The Trust Territory established a social security system in 1967 at 
the request of the United Nations, which held that a good trustee 
should develop a social security system for such a territory. (The 
author worked on this project, and the system was established and 
operated successfully thereafter.) 
When the Trust Territory was divided, a unique problem arose: 
how to divide a social security system equitably among different geo-
graphical regions. A subdivision was made, and each entity received 
an equitable share of the assets (and of the future liabilities, too). 
The Northern Mariana Islands system merely joined the U.S. system, 
and credit was given for all prior service as though it had been per-
formed in the continental United States. The three new independent 
countries started with the existing system, but undoubtedly they will 
modify it in the future. Many persons there think that a retirement 
age of 60 is too high and they want to lower it. These individuals 
may not realize that the long-run high costs of such a move will be 
difficult to bear. 
12 Canada 
Next we come to Canada. One small change made in 1991 greatly 
affected the underlying philosophy of its social security system. 
Canada, like the United Kingdom, has two plans. One is called Old 
Age Security, under which a flat amount is payable to every person in 
the country age 65 or older who meets certain residence and citizen-
ship requirements. The other is an earnings-related system, called 
the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan. The combination of these two plans 
produces a weighted-benefits structure, just as prevails in the U.S. 
system. With the flat benefit and an earnings-related benefit, lower 
paid persons receive relatively higher benefits than do higher paid 
ones. The combined level of benefits in Canada is about the same as 
that in the U.s. 
The small change in Canadian policy was made considering only 
budget effects and not the long-range social effects. The government 
introduced what some persons refer to as the Claw-Back. This is anal-
ogous to a lobster clawing money back! 
Under this provision, individuals with moderately high income, 
roughly C$50,000 a year or more, must return part of the flat pension. 
This provision is to be phased in over several years. After some 
years, the benefit under the Old Age Security system will not be 
15 
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available to the highest income Canadians. The income limit at 
which this applies is only partially indexed; as time goes by, more 
persons will be affected by the provision. The system will become 
more a public assistance (or social assistance) system instead of a 
social insurance or demogrant program. This has been a significant 
change in the philosophy of the Canadian system. It is not clear 
whether the change was intentional. 
13 Chile 
The new Chilean system, which was established in 1981, 
involves privatization and individual defined-contribution accounts 
that are determined in real terms (Le., indexed for inflation). It rep-
resents one of the most interesting and important developments in 
social security in the last decade or so. Many countries around the 
world-not just North, Central, and South American countries, but 
also some European countries-are interested in this emerging pension 
system. 
Many observers do not realize that the system involves mores 
than privatized individual accounts. The government also must make 
mammoth transfer payments from general revenues to meet the cost of 
prior service credits and large minimum-benefit guarantees. Further, 
much of the investments of the private funds are in government bonds, 
which probably were issued to meet the foregoing costs-a circular 
effect! Although this large cost to the government might be accept-
able in Chile (which would have had equally high, or even larger, 
costs under its previous system), this might not be acceptable in other 
countries. 
The Chilean system is now 12 years old, and it seems to be oper-
ating well. A cautious actuary must say, "Twelve years is a short 
time in the life of any sort of pension plan." Not that any catastro-
phe is likely to occur, but its experience may not be as favorable as 
its supporters anticipate. In particular, the real interest rate earned 
by the various privatized funds may not be nearly as high over the 
long run as is expected. The purchased annuities would not be as large 
as is now anticipated. 
14 United States of America 
We come finally to the United States. Two major issues are pre-
sent in its social security program (officially known as the Old-Age, 
Survivors, and Disability Insurance program). One is the controversy 
about the so-called retirement earnings test, under which persons who 
16 
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are at least the normal retirement age (currently 65) but not yet age 
70 receive reduced benefits when they have earnings that exceed a 
certain limit. If earnings are sufficiently high, all benefits are lost. 
The test is not applicable at age 70 and over, and it applies on a 
more stringent basis to beneficiaries under the normal retirement age. 
When benefits are received in later years, increases are given to 
reflect the benefits that are lost, but such increases currently are 
lower than those needed to provide actuarial equivalence. In 1993, 
such persons can earn up to $10,560 a year and still receive full bene-
fits. But for every $3 of earnings above this limit $1 of benefits is 
lost. 
A delayed-retirement credit (ORC) is given to individuals who 
lose benefits in this way, either because of not claiming benefits or 
because benefits are reduced thereby. For persons who reach age 65 in 
1992 and 1993, the ORC is 4 percent per year of delay, pro-rated on a 
monthly basis. Under present law, the ORC gradually will be raised 
until it will reach 8 percent a year (which is about the actuarial 
equivalent) for persons who attain the normal retirement age in 2009 
(then age 66). In other words, a person who then does not take bene-
fits at the normal retirement age of 66 and waits until age 70 gets a 
32 percent increase. This is about the same increase that a private 
insurance company would give under similar circumstances to a person 
who buys an annuity. 
This test is unpopular with many persons. Critics say that it dis-
courages persons from working and that, therefore, it is undesirable 
because work incentives are reduced. For many years, the author was 
a strong supporter of this test, under the simple but logical principle 
that retirement pensions should not be paid to persons who are not 
retired. After long deliberation about this matter and looking closely 
at the experience, it became evident that persons who had earnings 
of anywhere from about 50 percent to 150 percent of the average wage 
(currently, about $23,000 a year) receive little in their take-home 
pay if they continue working after age 65. Of course, for highly paid 
professionals who earn $100,000 or more per year, this is a different 
matter. But persons who earn $12,000 to $35,000 a year have great 
disincentives to work because the net additional income in their 
pockets from working is so small. 
Therefore, it is clear that something should be done about this 
provision. The test should be eliminated for persons who are above 
the normal retirement age (currently 65), but under age 70, although 
they still should receive larger benefits if they continue working and 
do not collect benefits. They should receive 8 percent more per year in 
their eventual benefits under such circumstances. It is true that this 
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change would result in higher program costs, but only with respect to 
persons who attain the normal retirement age before 2008. (This is a 
low cost period for the program.) When measured over the long 
range, the average increase in cost is small (and can be met in several 
ways, none being especially painful-for example a temporary 
increase in the maximum taxable earnings base or, when changing the 
financing to a pay-as-you-go basis, not reducing the payroll-tax rates 
in the next two decades as much). 
Next consider briefly the current financial situation of the U.S. 
Social Security program. Some say that it is going bankrupt, that it 
is in terrible financial condition, etc. Many in the United States 
think so, because they have heard or read about it somewhere. It is 
difficult to correct such misinformation. The program did have severe 
financial problems in the early 1980s, but these have been solved 
reasonably well. 
At the end of 1992 the trust-fund balance was $331 billion; this is 
almost equal to one year's benefit outgo. The trust fund is building 
rapidly, some $60 billion to $70 billion a year in the next few years 
and increasingly larger amounts for the next 15 years. From the short-
range standpoint, the system is financially strong. But, as stated pre-
viously, one has to look beyond 20 years, because that is a short time 
in the life of a social insurance or pension program. Under the present 
method of financing, a large fund balance will be built over the next 
three decades according to the intermediate cost estimate in the 1993 
Trustees Report. And it will reach a level of about $5 trillion in 
about 30 years. After then, however, it will decrease rapidly. In 
another ten years, it will be exhausted. 
In the long run (after the year 2035), the system will have finan-
cial problems according to the current estimates under the intermedi-
ate assumptions. These can be solved at some time in the future, 
either by raising the contribution rates somewhat or by raising the 
normal retirement age (or both). There already has been a move in 
the latter direction. The normal retirement age slowly will increase 
under current law from the present age 65 (which has been in effect in 
the 56 years of operation of the system), beginning in 2003, to age 67 
in 2027. An increase even to age 68 would have a significant financial 
effect. 
The difficulty with the financing procedure for the U.S. system is 
that it is faulty in building a large fund and then drawing it down. 
Also-at least in this type of program and in the prevailing politi-
cal process-building a large fund is undesirable. This may seem a 
strange thing for an actuary to say! Usually, if one is the actuary for 
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a pension plan, it would seem that the more money that one has, the 
better is the situation. 
In this case, three good reasons exist why the procedure of build-
ing a large fund is undesirable. First, under the manner in which the 
federal budget is reported, the enormity of the deficit is hidden, to 
some extent, by the annual excesses of income over outgo of the trust 
funds. Second, the ready availability of these excesses for general 
purpose borrowing by the federal government could cause Congress and 
the executive branch to be less frugal than would be the case if bor-
rowing were necessary from the private marketplace. Third, the 
mammoth size of the fund could cause irresistible pressures from the 
beneficiaries to overliberalize current benefits, thereby creating 
insupportable long-range costs. 
Nonetheless, the amount of the present fund balance is needed as 
a contingency reserve in case an economic recession occurs. That bal-
ance (about one year's outgo) probably would get the system through 
any sort of business recession, even though income to the trust funds 
may be smaller than currently is projected. 
The program has two trust funds, the Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance Trust Fund and the Disability Insurance Trust Fund. These 
two funds usually are considered in combination when the financial 
status of the program is analyzed. The current estimates 
(intermediate) indicate that the combined funds will be exhausted in 
2036, with the OASI fund lasting until 2044, but the DI fund only 
until 1995. This is not a significant problem, however, because the 
allocation of the OASDI tax rate can be changed slightly-as has 
been done several times in the past-to show both funds being 
exhausted at about the same time. Such reallocation would not have 
any effect on the taxes paid by workers and employers in the aggre-
gate. 
The foregoing discussion has not related to the Medicare program, 
which consists of hospital insurance (HI) and supplementary medical 
insurance (SMI). The former is financed by payroll taxes on almost 
the same persons as OASDI covers, while the latter is financed by 
premiums on the enrolled beneficiaries and by general revenues 
(which currently bear 75 percent of the cost). The HI program is 
estimated to have financial difficulties in the next ten years, its 
trust fund being exhausted in 1999 under the intermediate estimate. 
The SMI program rates are established in the law for years through 
1995 at an apparently more than adequate level, and thereafter they 
can be adjusted by promulgations of the executive branch on the basis 
of experience. 
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Although the HI program has great financing problems over the 
long range, so too does the diverse health insurance system for the 
working population and its dependents. The solution to both sets of 
problems must be found simultaneously, perhaps by a radical change 
in the method of financing health care (which could mean the elimi-
nation of the Medicare program by the substitution of a universal sys-
tem). 
The solution to the foregoing problem of roller-coaster financing of 
the OASDI program is to change to responsible pay-as-you-go financ-
ing. Such a procedure was followed from the mid-1950s until the 1977 
amendments. For more details on this matter, see Myers (1989). 
The change to pay-as-you-go financing could be accomplished by 
lowering immediately the combined employer/employee tax rate by 1 
percent for the next ten to fifteen years and then having the rate 
slowly increase over the years. Ultimately, the rate would have to 
be about 5 percent above the present 12.4 percent rate-just as would 
be necessary under present law after the trust funds are exhausted. As 
an alternative to such higher ultimate rates, the benefit costs could 
be reduced (e.g., by increasing the normal retirement age more than is 
provided for under present law). For more details on pay-as-you-go 
financing and its advantages, see Myers (1991). 
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